As Cameroonians prepare for yet another presidential election, the question dominating political debate is whether the opposition can finally unseat the ruling Cameroon People’s Democratic Movement (CPDM), in power since 1985 under President Paul Biya. The campaign, now in full swing, is marked by fresh promises, familiar grievances, and renewed calls for unity among opposition figures. Yet, the structural realities of Cameroon’s politics reflected in parliamentary composition, past voting patterns, and institutional control tell a sobering story.
Since the return to multiparty politics in 1992, the CPDM has maintained an unbroken grip on power. The ruling party’s vote share surged from 40% in 1992 to a staggering 93% in 1997, before stabilising around 70–78% in subsequent elections. This dominance has been mirrored in the legislature, where the CPDM holds 152 of 180 seats in the National Assembly and 94 of 100 seats in the Senate.
These figures underscore a political imbalance that has persisted for decades, leaving the opposition fractured, under-resourced, and often marginalised. In a country where state institutions are deeply intertwined with the ruling party, changing the political order requires more than popular frustration. It demands organisation, coordination, and endurance.
Opposition forces are not sitting idle. Across the political spectrum, leaders are recognising that individual efforts are unlikely to unseat the incumbent. Calls for unity have grown louder, with figures such as Bello Bouba Maigari, Akere Muna, and Ateki Seta engaging in coalition to form a “common programme” aimed at winning elections by monitoring elections and countering fraud.
Campaign events have multiplied in key cities like Maroua, Garoua, Douala, Bafoussam, and Yaoundé, focusing on citizen participation and accountability. In the diaspora, activists are using digital platforms to mobilise voters and amplify concerns about transparency and inclusivity. Yet, despite the energy, the opposition remains deeply divided by ideology, strategy, and ambition.
Attempts to field a single opposition candidate have repeatedly failed. While some parties advocate federalism and deep political reform, others prioritise incremental change within the current constitutional framework. Personal rivalries and mistrust further complicate collaboration. As a result, the opposition often competes more against itself than against the CPDM splitting votes in a system already tilted towards incumbency.
The exclusion of Maurice Kamto, one of the most popular challengers in recent elections, from the 2025 race, has also deepened disillusionment among opposition supporters. Though Kamto’s camp has denounced the Constitutional Council’s decision as politically motivated, his absence seems to be reducing the opposition’s chances of consolidating around a figure with national appeal despite Tchiroma’s recent emergence.
Beyond internal divisions, the opposition faces formidable institutional barriers. The national elections body, ELECAM, the National Counting Commission and the Constitutional Council are widely perceived as sympathetic to the government. Opposition parties have limited access to public media and face restrictions in organising rallies.
Press freedom and civic space remain constrained, with journalists facing harassment and local media subjected to censorship or intimidation. As the campaign intensifies, government directives suspending political debates on state and private media have further limited avenues for public scrutiny and voter education.
Financial constraints also weigh heavily. The CPDM’s access to state resources allows it to outspend rivals in campaign logistics, advertising, and mobilisation, particularly in rural areas where infrastructure and information flow are limited.
Despite these disadvantages, not all signs are bleak for opposition movements. Public fatigue with long-standing governance patterns, corruption, unemployment, insecurity, and service delivery failures provides fertile ground for alternative narratives.
In particular, the Anglophone regions, where the crisis has disrupted normal life for years, remain disillusioned with the state’s response. Although insecurity restricts open campaigning, the sentiment for change is strong. Urban youth, increasingly vocal on social media, are also questioning the status quo and expressing solidarity across party lines.
The rise of women and youth participation in public discourse could alter the long-term landscape. Cameroon’s parliament now includes 34% women, above the Central African average, signalling slow but visible shifts in political culture. Whether this translates into substantive representation or voter realignment remains to be seen.
Across the Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS), Cameroon’s GDP per capita of $1,865 trails significantly behind oil-rich neighbours like Gabon ($8,844) and Equatorial Guinea ($7,750). Such economic disparity fuels frustration among citizens who see little improvement in living standards despite decades of stability.
Meanwhile, neighbouring countries like Rwanda and Angola have demonstrated how leadership transitions even within dominant party systems can refresh governance and attract new investment. The Cameroonian opposition often references these examples to argue that change need not mean chaos.
As campaigns unfold, opposition voices are increasingly professionalising their message. They are focusing on issues like governance, youth employment, federalism, justice rather than solely on personalities. Civil society and diaspora groups have launched initiatives to monitor polling stations and report irregularities, while independent media continue to spotlight disparities in campaign coverage.
However, the CPDM still controls the machinery of the state, from local administrative officers to the distribution of campaign permits. In a context where incumbency confers enormous advantages, the opposition’s best outcome may be to narrow the gap, build institutional credibility, and lay the foundation for a stronger showing in future elections.
So, can the opposition unseat the incumbent in 2025? The evidence suggests it remains a daunting challenge. The CPDM’s dominance in both the legislative and institutional landscape, coupled with the fragmentation of opposition forces, makes an outright victory improbable under current conditions.
Yet, the ongoing mobilisation from coalition talks to digital advocacy and diaspora engagement marks a qualitative shift in Cameroon’s opposition politics. The opposition may not win this election, but its growing insistence on transparency, unity, and citizen empowerment could redefine the political discourse for years to come.
In a country where change has long seemed impossible, the 2025 campaign might not yet deliver power, but it could deliver purpose and that, in the long view, is how every real transformation begins.
🟦 Campaign Pulse Insight: Why this matters
- Parliamentary dominance: CPDM holds 152 of 180 seats in the National Assembly and 94 of 100 in the Senate which is a near-total grip on decision-making.
- Fragmented opposition: Over 20 registered parties, but no unified front or single challenger with national appeal.
- Women in politics: Now 34% in parliament, the highest in Central Africa showing potential for gradual structural change.
- Economic strain: Cameroon’s GDP per capita ($1,865) lags behind regional peers, fuelling youth frustration.
- Digital engagement: Rising online activism, especially among urban youth, is shaping new political conversations.
- Security and access: Conflict zones and media restrictions continue to hinder open opposition mobilisation.
As the October 12 presidential election approaches, the numbers still favour the incumbent but the ideas and voices reshaping the opposition are beginning to matter just as much as the votes.